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Abstract: We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations on democratic 
institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploit the very persistent 
response of income to oil price fluctuations to study the effect of persistent (oil 
price-driven) income shocks on democracy. Our results indicate that countries 
with greater net oil exports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutions 
following upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1 percentage point 
increase in per capita GDP growth due to a positive oil price shock increases the 
Polity democracy score by around 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 
2 percentage points in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratic 
transition is around 0.4 percentage points. 
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The effect of natural resource wealth and income on political institutions is a central issue at the 
intersection of economics and political sciences. We contribute to this research by examining the effect 
of international oil price fluctuations on democratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also 
exploit the very persistent response of aggregate income to oil prices to study the effect of persistent 
(oil price-driven) income shocks on democracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oil 
exports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutions following upturns in international oil 
prices. For example, positive oil price shocks lead to improvements in the Polity democracy score—as 
well as the subscores for executive constraints, executive recruitment, political competition—and a 
higher probability of a democratic transition. We estimate that an oil price-driven 1 percentage point 
increase in per capita GDP growth increases the Polity democracy score by around 0.2 percentage 
points on impact and by around 2 percentage points in the long run. The effect on the probability of a 
democratic transition is around 0.4 percentage points. 
Our work relates to the literature on the link between political institutions and natural resource 
wealth and income. An influential early contribution is Lipset (1959) who documents that high-income 
countries tend to be more democratic. He argues that this positive correlation arises because higher per 
capita income is a symptom of the modernization of society, and that modernization also increases 
citizens’ demand for political participation. The positive association between income and democracy 
has also been emphasized by Huntington (1991), who defends that higher per capita income was one of 
the key factors behind the so-called third wave of democratization, and by Przeworski et al. (2000), 
who argue that higher per capita income averts autocratic reversals. For further evidence on the positive 
association between income and democracy, see Barro (1999), Boix and Stokes (2003), Epstein et al. 
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(2006), Glaeser et al. (2007), and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a). Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009) 
focus on the within-country association between income and democracy using a panel-data approach 
with country-specific fixed effects. This approach has the advantage of accounting for all fixed country 
characteristics that may affect both income and political institutions. Acemoglu et al. find no 
association between income and democracy once country-specific fixed effects are accounted for. 
As is well understood, income fluctuations are driven by transitory shocks like monetary policy 
or rainfall shocks, as well as permanent shocks like technology or oil price shocks (e.g. Hamilton, 
1994). The literature on the determinants of democracy suggests that it may be important to distinguish 
between the effects of transitory income shocks on democratic institutions and the effects of permanent 
income shocks. For example, Lipset’s modernization hypothesis is probably best interpreted as a 
positive response of democratic institutions to permanent increases in income. On the other hand, 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001, 2006) theory of political transition yields that transitory positive 
income shocks may decrease the probability of a democratic transition. It is therefore interesting to ask 
how the effects of transitory and permanent income shocks on democracy can be distinguished 
empirically. One approach is to focus on different sources of income shocks.
1 For example, Brückner 
and Ciccone (2010) exploit within-country variation in rainfall as a source of transitory shocks to 
aggregate income in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, the response of aggregate income to oil 
prices is very persistent, and the response of democratic institutions to oil price-driven income shocks 
is therefore better thought of as the response of democracy to permanent income shocks.
2
                                                 
1   Another approach is to examine the within-country association between income and democracy over 
different time spans. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2009) look at the year-to-year association, the association 
over 5-year time spans, and the association over 25-year time spans. 
2   Ciccone (2008) discusses estimation of the effects of transitory and permanent income shocks in more 
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The literature on oil and democracy is closely related to the political science and economics 
literature on the effect of natural resources on political institutions and long-term growth (see Van der 
Ploeg, 2010, for a review). An important strand of this literature argues that natural resource abundance 
leads to less democratic institutions (e.g. Huntington, 1991; Karl, 1997). Several empirical studies have 
found that the cross-country association between indicators of oil wealth and political institutions is 
consistent with this argument, see Ross (2001, 2009), Collier and Hoeffler (2009), Ramsey (2009), and 
Tsui (2010) for example. For studies that question the negative cross-sectional relationship between 
natural resources on the one hand and institutions and long-term growth on the other, see Stijns (2006) 
and Alexeev and Conrad (2009). There are also studies of the within-country association between oil 
income and political institutions.
3 Haber and Menaldo (2010) examine the relationship between several 
measures of oil income and democracy going back as far as 1861. Their approach exploits the variation 
of oil prices as well as changes in oil production. Haber and Menaldo’s main finding is that if anything, 
the data point to a positive rather than a negative effect of oil income on democracy. Wacziarg (2009) 
studies the time-series relationship between international oil prices and democratic institutions. This 
approach has the advantage of not relying on changes in oil production, which are endogenous and may 
respond to factors that also affect political institutions. Wacziarg finds a positive relationship between 
oil prices and democracy in OPEC countries but no link in his full sample. Our analysis differs from 
Wacziarg’s in that we study the effect of international oil prices on democracy by examining the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
detail. 
3    For example, Burke and Leigh (2010) examine the within-country association between commodity 
prices and year-to-year rainfall variation on the one hand and democratic institutions on the other. Caselli and 
Tesei (2010) focus on the heterogeneous response of political institutions in democracies and autocracies to 
commodity price shocks and also study differences in the response among autocracies. For within-country 
results on natural resources and growth and human capital accumulation see Stijns (2006). 
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interaction between net oil exports over GDP and changes in oil prices over time. This approach allows 
us to control for common time effects to capture global factors like the end of the Cold War or the 
world business cycle that may affect both oil prices and democracy. 
  The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the 
estimating equations and Section 4 our main empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data  
Annual data on international oil prices for the 1960-2007 period are from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development Commodity Statistics (UNCTAD, 2009). Figure 1 graphs the 
evolution of the oil price level over the 1960-2007 period. The figure suggests that international oil 
price fluctuations are persistent. This is confirmed by several econometric diagnostics. For example, an 
AR(1) regression using the natural logarithm (ln) of the international oil price yields an auto-regression 
coefficient of 0.99 when controlling for a quadratic trend and an auto-regression coefficient of 1.00 
when controlling for a linear trend. Moreover, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test does not reject the 
hypothesis of a unit root in oil price levels at the 90% confidence level (but rejects the hypothesis of a 
unit root in the first-differenced oil price at the 99% confidence level). The Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) 
test rejects the stationarity of oil price levels at the 95% confidence level (but does not reject the 
stationarity of the first-differenced oil price at the 90% confidence level).
4 And the Andrews and Zivot 
(1992) test, which allows for a structural break in the mean and the trend of oil price levels, fails to 
reject the hypothesis of a unit root in oil price levels at the 90% confidence level (but rejects the 
hypothesis of a unit root in the first-differenced oil price at the 99% confidence level). We therefore 
proceed under the assumption that there is a unit root in international oil prices but that first-differenced 
                                                 
4   The kernel bandwidth in the Kwiatkowski et al. test is based on the Newey and West (1994) automated 
bandwidth selection criteria and set equal to 5.  
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oil prices are stationary. 
  If there is a unit root in international oil prices, the change in oil prices over time corresponds to 
oil price shocks. Our indicator of the economic impact of international oil price shocks in country c is  
(1)       ln , OilPriceShock OilPrice ct c t θ = Δ , 
where θc is oil exports minus oil imports relative to GDP over the whole time period considered or at 
some point in time, and  lnOilPricet Δ  is the ln-change in international oil prices over time. This 
formulation captures that the impact of international oil price shocks should be greater in countries with 
greater net oil exports over GDP. The data on oil exports and oil imports are from the NBER-United 
Nations Trade Database (Feenstra et al., 2004). The cross-country maximum (minimum) of θc 
calculated over the 1960-2007 period is 0.18 (-0.03) and the cross-country mean (median) is 0.009 (-
0.001). 
  Our main measure of democracy is the revised combined Polity score (Polity2) from the Polity 
IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). The revised combined Polity score is based on subscores for 
constraints on the chief executive, the competitiveness of political participation, and the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment. The Polity2 score ranges from -10 to +10. Higher values 
denote more democratic institutions. The Polity IV project also provides the subscores for constraints 
on the executive, political competition, and executive recruitment. The executive constraints subscore 
measures the extent of institutional constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives. The 
score ranges from 1 to 7, with higher values denoting stronger executive constraints. The political 
competition score measures the degree of institutionalization of political competition and the extent of 
government restriction on political competition. This score ranges from 1 to 10, with greater values 
denoting more political competition. The openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment score 
measures the ways in which social superordinates come to occupy their positions of political authority. 
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The score ranges from 1 to 8, with greater values indicating more open and competitive executive 
recruitment.
5 The Polity IV project codes times of interregnum (anarchy) as a Polity2 score of 0. This 
coding rule may give a misleading picture of progress toward democracy as autocracies with negative 
Polity2 scores that fall into anarchy improve their Polity2 scores. Moreover, the Polity2 score is 
interpolated during multi-year transitions following an interregnum (anarchy) period. To deal with 
these coding issues and also ensure comparability between the Polity2 score and the Polity subscores 
(which are missing for interregnum periods), our baseline results exclude country-years that correspond 
to interregnum periods or transition periods associated with interregnum. But we also examine results 
for Polity2 with interregnum and transition periods and results based on the Polity IV Regtrans 
variable, which is a discrete version of the Polity2 variable. 
  We also construct a democratic transition indicator that takes the value of 1 in year t if the 
country is a democracy in year t but was an autocracy in year t-1; and an autocratic reversal indicator 
that takes the value of 1 in year t if the country is an autocracy in year t but was a democracy in year t-
1. Following the Polity IV project, countries are coded as democracies if their Polity2 score is strictly 
positive; otherwise countries are coded as autocracies.
6 Table 1 provides some summary statistics of 
our measures of democracy. 
 
3. Estimation 
                                                 
5   The sample correlation of the within-country change in the executive constraints and political 
competition (executive recruitment) score is 0.63 (0.70). The sample correlation of the within-country change in 
the political competition and executive recruitment score is 0.63. 
6    We also examined results for democratic transition and autocratic reversal indicators that treat 
interregnum periods as missing observations. This did not affect our main results. 
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Our main reduced form equation relates changes in countries’ democracy score between t-1 and t 
, ct Democ Δ  to the oil price shock in (1), 
(2)  ,,
  , Democ a b dOilPriceShock e ct c t ct ct Δ= + + +  
where ac and bt are country and year fixed effects; d the main coefficient of interest; and ec,t an error 
term that is clustered at the country level. The method of estimation is least squares. To examine 
whether oil price shocks induce a change in countries’ democratic institutions through per capita GDP 
growth  , ln ct GDP Δ , we estimate 
(3)   ln ,,
  Democ GDP ct c t ct ct , α βδ ε Δ= + + Δ+ , 
where αc and βt are country and year fixed effects; δ the main coefficient of interest; εc,t an error term 
that is clustered at the country level; and GDP growth is instrumented by oil price shocks. The method 
of estimation is two-stage least squares. The implicit exclusion restriction is that oil price shocks affect 
democracy exclusively through per capita GDP. 
 
4. Main Results 
Reduced Form Estimates   Table 2 presents the reduced form effect of oil price shocks on our main 
measures of democratic institutions. Column (1) shows that a positive oil price shock in period t leads 
to a statistically significant increase in the Polity2 score. Oil price shocks in period t-1 and t-2 enter 
also with a positive coefficient but the effects are less precisely estimated. In column (2) we find that 
the average annual oil price shock between t and t-2 has a statistically significant positive effect on the 
Polity2 score. Figure 2 graphs the oil price and the Polity2 score for some countries that fit the pattern 
of the panel regressions. The reduced form effect of oil price shocks on the Polity subscores for 
executive constraints, executive recruitment and political competition is presented in columns (3)-(8). 
While the timing is different across subscores, all statistically significant effects point to a positive 
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effect of oil price shocks on democratic institutions. The table also shows results for the 3-year oil price 
shock defined as in (1) with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3. The effect of a positive oil 
price shock on democracy is positive and statistically significant for all scores except executive 
constraints. The size of the effect on the Polity2 score implies that a 10 percentage point increase in 
international oil prices increases the Polity2 score on impact by around 0.012 points for every 10 
percentage point increase in net oil over GDP. This increase in the Polity2 score is approximately 0.06 
percentage points of its range (which goes from -10 to +10). 
  Table 3 allows for slow adjustment of democratic institutions to 3-year oil price shocks by 
including the lagged Polity2 score as an additional explanatory variable. The method of estimation is 
least squares or system-GMM estimation (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The results indicate that the 
Polity2 score adjusts very slowly to shocks and that the long-run effect of a shock on the Polity2 score 
is around 10 times the effect on impact.
7 The long-run effect of the oil price shock on the Polity2 score 
implies that a 10 percentage point increase in international oil prices increases the Polity2 score on 
impact by around 0.9 percentage points of its range for every 10 percentage point increase in net oil 
over GDP. 
  Table 4 indicates that positive oil price shocks have a statistically significant, positive, and 
persistent effect on purchasing-power-parity GDP per capita growth from the Penn World Tables.
8 
Columns (1) and (2) show that the effect is statistically significant on impact. The size of the effect 
implies that a 10 percentage point increase in international oil prices increases per capita GDP growth 
by around 1 percentage point for every 10 percentage point increase in net oil over GDP. Columns (3) 
                                                 
7   The long-run adjustment can be obtained as the adjustment on impact multiplied by the inverse of the 
coefficient on lagged Polity2 multiplied by -1. 
8   For information on the Penn World Tables GDP data see Heston et al. (2009). 
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and (4) show that the effect remains statistically significant after 3 years and that the strength of the 
effect is very similar to the effect on impact. Columns (5) and (6) show that the effect is also 
statistically significant after 5 years and that the strength of the effect continues to be similar to the 
effect on impact. The effect of oil price shocks on GDP growth over 10 years remains statistically 
significant and is about 2/3 of the effect on impact. Table 5 contains analogous results for the Polity2 
score. Columns (1) and (2) show the effect on impact. The size of the effect implies that a 10 
percentage point increase in international oil prices increases the Polity2 score by around 0.017 
percentage points of its range for every 10 percentage point increase in net oil over GDP. Columns (3) 
and (4) show that the effect remains statistically significant after 3 years and is around 3 times stronger 
than the effect on impact. The effect after 5 and 10 years is still statistically significant and similar to 
the effect after 3 years. 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates   Table 6, Panel A presents two-stage least squares estimates that 
use oil price shocks as an instrumental variable for real per capita GDP growth. The specifications are 
analogous to the reduced-form specifications in Table 3 in all other regards.
9 We find positive and 
statistically significant effects on the Polity2 score as well as the subscores for executive constraints, 
executive recruitment, and political competition. The point estimate implies that a 1 percentage point 
increase in per capita GDP leads to an increase in the Polity2 score of 0.22 percentage points of its 
range on impact. The impact response of the Polity subscores for executive constraints and executive 
recruitment corresponds to 0.16 percentage points of their respective ranges and the response of the 
                                                 
9   All two-stage least squares regressions control for country and year fixed effects as well as the lagged 
democracy score (estimates are not reported). System-GMM results continue to be very similar to least squares 
results (see Tables 3-5) and are therefore no longer reported. 
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political competition subscore to 0.26 percentage points of its range.
10 The coefficient estimates and 
significance levels on the lagged democracy scores are very similar to those in Table 3, and the implied 
long-run effects therefore continue to be around 10 times the impact effects (see page 8). Hence, the 
long-run effect of a 1 percentage point increase in per capita GDP is an increase in the Polity2 score of 
2.2 percentage points of its range. The table also reports the first-stage F-statistic; the statistic is around 
45, substantially above the threshold of 10 recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997), which indicates 
that weak instruments should not be an important concern. 
  Table 6, Panel B reports least squares estimates of the effect of per capita GDP on democracy. 
Least squares estimates are positive but smaller than two-stage least squares estimates and statistically 
insignificant in most cases. This might be due to measurement error in GDP growth (e.g. Heston, 1994; 
Deaton, 2005; Johnson et al., 2009). If measurement error is classical and unrelated to oil price shocks, 
least squares estimates would be biased toward zero but two-stage least squares estimates would be 
unaffected. Least squares estimates could also be smaller because they end up capturing the effect of a 
GDP shock with ‘average’ persistence, as GDP is subject to permanent as well as transitory shocks.
11 
On the other hand, two-stage least squares estimates using oil price shocks as an instrument capture the 
effect of very persistent GDP shocks. There could also be other reasons for the discrepancy between 
least squares estimates and two-stage least squares estimates. For example, oil-price-driven income 
shocks might have stronger effects on government tax revenues or the interpersonal income distribution 
                                                 
10   Dropping lagged democracy scores yields the following impact effects (t-statistics): 3.21 (2.55) for 
Polity2; 0.7 (1.31) for executive constraints; 0.93 (2.27) for executive recruitment; and 2.1 (3.37) for political 
competition. Hence, the effects continue to be statistically significant except for executive constraints. 
11   Put differently, the discrepancy could be due to shocks with different degrees of persistence having 
different effects on democratic institutions. See Angrist and Pischke (2009) for more on instrumental-variables 
estimation in the presence of heterogeneous effects. 
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than other shocks to GDP. 
  Tables 7 and 8 implement tests of the overidentifying restriction that oil price shocks affect 
democracy only through GDP. The approach in Table 7 uses lagged GDP per capita levels as an 
additional instrument for GDP growth. Lagged GDP levels can be used as an additional instrument if 
they affect democratic institutions only through GDP growth. Table 7, Panel A reports the joint F-
statistic for the first-stage effect of oil price shocks and lagged GDP levels on GDP growth, which 
indicates that weak instruments should not be an important concern. The table also reports the p-values 
of the Hansen test of overidentifying restriction. The Hansen test rejects the hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restriction is violated. Table 7, Panel B reports the effect of oil price shocks on 
democratic institutions conditional on per capita GDP growth instrumented by lagged GDP levels. The 
F-statistic for the first-stage effect of lagged GDP levels on GDP growth suggests that the instrument is 
quite strong. Our results indicate that the (direct) effect of oil price shocks is statistically insignificant. 
The effect of GDP growth conditional on oil price shocks is also statistically insignificant. One reason 
could be that the lagged GDP instrument captures mostly differences in GDP growth due to mean 
reversion and that such growth differences have a weaker or no effect on democratic institutions. Table 
8 examines results using lagged savings rates as an instrument for income (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 
2008).
12 Table 8, Panel A reports two-stage least squares estimates where per capita GDP growth is 
instrumented by both the change in the savings rate between t-1 and t-2 and the oil price shock 
variable. The first-stage regression yields a joint F-statistic of around 25 which indicates that weak 
instruments are again not a main concern. The effect of per capita GDP growth on democratic 
institutions is statistically significant and similar to our previous results. The Hansen test does not reject 
                                                 
12   The savings rate is calculated as 1 minus consumption over GDP using data from the Penn World 
Tables. 
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the overidentifying restriction. Table 8, Panel B examines the effect of oil price shocks and per capita 
GDP growth separately using the change in the lagged savings rate as an instrument for GDP growth. 
The first-stage F-statistic is now below the Staiger and Stock (1997) threshold of 10 and indicates that 
weak instruments are a concern. As weak instruments can lead to severe biases in the two-stage least 
squares standard errors (and derived t-statistics), we also report the p-values of the Anderson-Rubin test 
of statistical significance in square brackets. A key property of this test is robustness to weak 
instruments. 2SLS standard errors (and derived t-statistics), on the other hand, are not robust to weak 
instruments, and inference based on 2SLS standard errors can be very misleading as a result. See 
Andrews and Stock (2005) for a review of these issues.
13 Our results suggest that oil price shocks do 
not have a statistically significant (direct) effect on democratic institutions conditional on GDP growth. 
The effect of per capita GDP growth on the Polity2 score and the subscore for executive recruitment is 
positive and statistically significant at the 90% confidence level according to the Anderson-Rubin test 
but statistically insignificant according to the t-statistic based on the two-stage least squares standard 
errors. The effect of GDP growth on the subscores for executive constraints and political competition is 
positive but statistically insignificant according to the t-statistic based on the two-stage least squares 
standard errors and the Anderson-Rubin test. 
Further Robustness Checks   International oil prices could be affected by (anticipated) GDP growth 
or political change in large producer and consumer countries. Table 9 therefore presents two-stage least 
squares effects of GDP growth on democratic institutions in countries that produce or consume less 
                                                 
13   The Anderson-Rubin test also has good power properties (it is a uniformly most powerful unbiased test 
under certain conditions). We implement a version of the Anderson-Rubin test that is robust to heteroskedasticity 
and arbitrary within-country correlation of the residuals. 
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than 1 percent of world oil production.
14 (Anticipated) GDP growth or political change in these 
countries is unlikely to have significant effects on international oil prices. The estimates in Table 9 
show that oil-price-driven GDP shocks continue to have a statistically significant effect on democratic 
institutions. The size of the effects is similar to our previous results except for executive constraints. 
  It is sometimes maintained that upturns in international oil prices are bad for economic and 
political development in countries where oil exports are an important share of GDP (e.g. Friedman, 
2006, 2008). Table 10 examines this view after restricting the sample to countries that are net oil 
exporters. The effect of oil-price-driven per capita GDP growth on democratic institutions continues to 
be positive and statistically significant, and point estimates are somewhat larger than in previous tables. 
Table 11 examines whether the effect of oil-price-driven GDP growth on democratic institutions is 
significantly different in OPEC countries. The difference between the effect in OPEC countries and in 
non-OPEC countries is captured by the interaction effect. This effect enters positively but is 
statistically insignificant.
15
  In Table 12 we split the sample into two sub-periods with a similar number of observations. 
Panel A presents two-stage least squares estimates for the pre-1987 period, while Panel B shows 
estimates for the post-1987 period. Oil price shocks have a statistically significant effect on per capita 
GDP in both samples. The effect of oil-price-driven GDP growth on the Polity2 score is also 
statistically significant in both samples. The point estimates for the Polity2 score are similar, 2.60 
                                                 
14   The excluded countries according to the 1 percent criterion are: Algeria, Canada, China, Germany, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. 
15   The first-stage effect of oil price shocks on GDP per capita for the OPEC oil exporters has a t-value of 
7.6 while the first-stage effect for the remaining countries hast a t-value of 5.3.  
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before 1987 and 2.57 after 1987. The results for Polity subscores are stronger for the post-1987 period. 
  Table 13 estimates the effect of oil-price-driven GDP growth on democratic institutions for the 
period after 1970. The value for net oil exports over GDP used in the oil price shock in (1) now 
corresponds to the beginning of the sample period (1970) to preclude any effect of international oil 
price fluctuations after 1970 on our measure of oil exports.
16 Oil-price-driven GDP growth continues to 
have a significantly positive effect on democratic institutions, except for executive constraints. 
  Oil-price-driven GDP growth could lead to improvements in Polity2 scores because it increases 
the probability of countries transiting from autocracy to democracy (a democratic transition) or because 
it decreases the probability of countries transiting from democracy to autocracy (an autocratic reversal). 
Table 14, column (1) shows that oil-price-driven GDP growth has a significantly positive effect on the 
probability of democratic transitions. A 1 percent increase in real per capita GDP due to oil price 
shocks increases the probability of a democratic transition by around 0.4 percentage points. Column (2) 
shows that oil-price-driven GDP growth also decreases the probability of autocratic reversals. But the 
point estimate is not statistically significant, even though it is larger than the point estimate on the 
probability of a transition to democracy.
17 Column (3) shows that oil-price-driven GDP growth 
continues to have a significant effect on changes in the Polity2 variable when we include interregnum 
periods (see page 6 above). And column (4) shows that there is also a significant effect of oil-price-
                                                 
16   Using average net exports over GDP after 1970 instead yields quantitatively and statistically stronger 
results. 
17   The linear probability model is the usually preferred method in instrumental variables estimation (see 
e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 2001). To ensure that results are not driven by the linear probability specification, we 
have also estimated reduced form transition equations using the conditional logit fixed effects estimator. These 
also yield a significant positive effect of oil price shocks on the probability of a transition to democracy and a 
negative but insignificant effect of oil price shocks on the probability of a transition to autocracy. 
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driven GDP growth on the discretized Polity IV Regtrans variable. 
  All estimates so far were based on the democracy measures from the Polity IV project. Table 15 
reports two-stage least squares estimates for alternative democracy measures. Column (1) reports the 
two-stage least squares effect of per capita GDP growth on the political rights score from Freedom 
House (2010). Column (2) reports the effect on the Freedom House trichotomous freedom indicator. 
Column (3) reports the effect on the Przeworski et al. (2000) binary democracy indicator, and column 
(4) reports the effect on the democracy indicator from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b). The main 
result is that oil-price-driven GDP growth leads to democratic improvements in all cases. 
  Table 16 uses constant-price GDP per capita growth data from the WDI (2010) instead of 
purchasing-power-parity GDP data from the Penn World Tables. The WDI data are entirely based on 
national income accounts and do not account for cross-country differences in prices, see Heston et al. 
(2009). Using WDI instead of Penn World Tables data on GDP growth leads to a drop in sample size of 
around 10%. Moreover, the first-stage F-statistics drop below 10, which indicates that weak 
instruments are a concern according to the Staiger and Stock (1997) criterion. We therefore report the 
p-values of the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance in square brackets in addition to the t-
statistics based on two-stage least squares standard errors; see page 11 above for more on the 
Anderson-Rubin test and two-stage least squares standard error with weak instruments. Table 16 shows 
that oil-price-driven per capita GDP growth continues to have a statistically significant positive effect 
on the Polity2 score at the 90% confidence level. For the democracy indicator from Papaioannou and 
Siourounis (2008b), the effect is positive but statistically insignificant according to the Anderson-Rubin 
test and the t-statistic based on the two-stage least squares standard error. For the other democracy 
indicators the effects are positive and statistically significant at the 90% level according to the 
Anderson-Rubin test but statistically insignificant according to the t-statistic based on the two-stage 
least squares standard errors. 
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5. Conclusion 
Upturns in international oil prices raise GDP growth more in countries with greater net oil exports over 
GDP, and the implied growth differentials are very persistent. These economic effects of international 
oil price fluctuations lead us to ask two main questions. How do upturns in international oil prices 
affect democratic institutions? And what is the effect of oil price-driven (persistent) income shocks on 
democracy? We find that countries with greater net oil exports over GDP see improvements in 
democratic institutions following upturns in international oil prices. An oil-price-driven 1 percentage 
point increase in per capita GDP growth leads to an improvement in the main Polity democracy score 
by around 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentage points in the long run. The 
effect on the probability of a democratic transition is around 0.4 percentage points. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Polity Measures 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Obs. 
Revised Combined Polity score (Polity2)   0.40  7.59  -10  10  4782 
Executive Constraints (Exconst)  3.99  2.36  1  7  4782 
Executive Recruitment (Exrec)  5.48  2.40  1  8  4782 
Political Competition (Polcomp)  5.20  3.73  1  10  4782 
Polity2 Including Interregnum   0.38  7.45  -10  10  5020 
Transition to Democracy Indicator  0.03  0.18  0  1  2649 
Transition to Autocracy Indicator  0.02  0.16  0  1  2371 



































Table 2. Oil Price Shocks and Democracy 
 
                  ΔPolity2                   ΔExconst               ΔExrec                      ΔPolcomp  
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) 

































3-Year Oil Price Shock    1.22** 
(2.49) 
  0.26 
(1.31) 
  0.35** 
(2.24) 
  0.79*** 
(3.45) 
Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 4782  4782  4782  4782  4782  4782  4782  4782 
 
Note: The method of estimation is least squares; t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country 
level. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the change in the Polity2 score; columns (3) and (4) the change in the executive constraints score;  
columns (5) and (6) the change in the executive recruitment score; and columns (7) and (8) the change in the political competition score. The 3-year oil 
price shock is defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 













Table 3. Oil Price Shocks, Democracy, and Polity Convergence 
 
                    ΔPolity2                    ΔExconst              ΔExrec                        ΔPolcomp  
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
  LS GMM LS  GMM  LS GMM LS  GMM 


































Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 4782  4782  4782  4782  4782  4782  4782  4782 
 
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) is least squares; columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). t-
statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in columns (1) and 
(2) is the change in the Polity2 score; columns (3) and (4) the change in the executive constraints score; columns (5) and (6) the change in the executive 
recruitment score; and columns (7) and (8) the change in the political competition score. The p-value on the Hansen J-test (AR2 test) of the overidentifying 
restrictions for the system-GMM estimation in column (2) is 0.97 (0.52), column (4) 0.77 (0.49), column (6) 0.67 (0.25), and column (8) 0.99 (0.90).  The 
3-year oil price shock is defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3.  Lagged democracy refers to the Polity2 score 
at t-1 in columns (1) and (2), and to the relevant Polity sub-score at t-1 in columns (3)-(8). *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 

















  Effect on GDP  
on Impact 
(t-->t) 
Effect on GDP  
After 3 Years 
(t-3-->t) 
Effect on GDP  
After 5 Years 
(t-5-->t) 
Effect on GDP  
After 10 Years 
(t-10-->t) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM 
















Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4782 4782 4625 4625 4409 4409 3829 3829 
 
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) is least squares; columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) system-GMM. t-statistics shown in 
parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the ln-change in real per capita 
GDP. Columns (1) and (2) show the effect of an oil price shock in year t on the ln-change in GDP between year t-1 and t, controlling for the level of real 
per capita GDP in year t-1. Columns (3) and (4) show the effect of an oil price shock in year t-3 on the ln-change in GDP between year t-4 and t, 
controlling for the level of real per capita GDP in year t-4. Columns (5) and (6) show the effect of an oil price shock in year t-5 on the ln-change in GDP 
between year t-6 and t, controlling for the level of real per capita GDP in year t-6. Columns (7) and (8) show the effect of an oil price shock in year t-10 on 
the ln-change in GDP between year t-11 and t, controlling for the level of real per capita GDP in year t-11. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 













 Effect  on  Polity2 
on Impact 
(t-->t) 
Effect on Polity2  
After 3 Years 
(t-3-->t) 
Effect on Polity2  
After 5 Years 
(t-5-->t) 
Effect on Polity2  
After 10 Years 
(t-10-->t) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM 
















Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4782 4782 4610 4610 4390 4390 3811 3811 
 
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) is least squares; columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) system-GMM. t-statistics shown in 
parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the change in the Polity2 score. 
Columns (1) and (2) show the effect of an oil price shock in year t on the change in the Polity2 score between year t-1 and t, controlling for the level of the 
Polity2 score in year t-1. Columns (3) and (4) show the effect of an oil price shock in year t-3 on the change in the Polity2 score between year t-4 and t, 
controlling for the level of the Polity2 score in year t-4. Columns (5) and (6) show the effect of an oil price shock in year t-5 on the change in the Polity2 
score between year t-6 and t, controlling for the level of the Polity2 score in year t-6. Columns (7) and (8) show the effect of an oil price shock in year t-10 
on the change in the Polity2 score between year t-11 and t, controlling for the level of the Polity2 score in year t-11. *Significantly different from zero at 90 























Table 6. Oil Price Shocks, Income, and Democracy 
 
                                  ΔPolity2                  ΔExconst                           ΔExrec                 ΔPolcomp  
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
  










First-Stage  F-statistic  45  45 45 45 
Country  FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  FE  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4782  4782 4782 4782 
  










Country  FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  FE  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Countries  4782  4782 4782 4782 
 
Note: The method of estimation in Panel A is two-stage least squares; Panel B least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable in Panel A is the 3-year oil price shock defined as in (1) in the main text 
with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3. The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the Polity2 score; column (2) the change in the 
executive constraints score; column (3) the change in the executive recruitment score; and column (4) the change in the political competition score. The 
specification in column (1) controls for the Polity2 score at t-1, and the specifications in columns (2)-(4) for the relevant Polity sub-score at t-1. 





Table 7. Oil Price Shocks, Income, and Democracy 
(Test of Exclusion Restriction I) 
 
                                       ΔPolity2                    ΔExconst                            ΔExrec                   ΔPolcomp  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  










Hansen J, p-value  0.74  0.93  0.85  0.46 
First-Stage F-statistic  71  71  71  71 
Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 4759  4759 4759 4759 
  
Panel B:  IV is Lagged GDP 
















First-Stage F-statistic  40  40  40  40 
Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Countries 4759  4759  4759  4759 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at 
the country level. The instrumental variable in Panel A is the 3-year oil price shock defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices 
between t and t-3 and the lagged level of real per capita GDP; in Panel B the instrumental variable is the lagged level of real per capita GDP. The 
dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the Polity2 score; column (2) the change in the executive constraints score; column (3) the change in the 
executive recruitment score; and column (4) the change in the political competition score. The specification in column (1) controls for the Polity2 score at 
t-1, and the specifications in columns (2)-(4) for the relevant Polity sub-score at t-1. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 








Table 8. Oil Price Shocks, Income, and Democracy 
(Test of Exclusion Restriction II) 
 
                                  ΔPolity2                  ΔExconst                           ΔExrec                 ΔPolcomp  
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
  










Hansen  J,  p-value  0.30  0.38 0.17 0.91 
First-Stage  F-statistic  25  25 25 25 
Country  FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  FE  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4731  4731 4731 4731 
  
Panel B:  IV is Lagged Savings Rate  




















First-Stage  F-statistic  7  7 7 7 
Country  FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  FE  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Countries  4731  4731 4731 4731 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at 
the country level. In Panel B the p-values in square brackets are based on the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance. A key property of the 
Anderson-Rubin test is robustness to weak instruments (see for example Andrews and Stock, 2005). The instrumental variable in Panel A is the 3-year oil 
price shock defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3 and the change in the savings rate between t-1 and t-2; in 
Panel B the instrumental variable is the lagged change in the savings rate between t-1 and t-2. The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the 
Polity2 score; column (2) the change in the executive constraints score; column (3) the change in the executive recruitment score; and column (4) the 
change in the political competition score. The specification in column (1) controls for the Polity2 score at t-1, and the specifications in columns (2)-(4) for 
the relevant Polity sub-score at t-1. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 









Table 9. Robustness I: Excluding Major Oil Producers and Oil Consumers 
 
                                                         ΔPolity2                        ΔExconst                          ΔExrec                        ΔPolcomp                                    
 









First-Stage  F-Statistic  21 21 21 21 
Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3957 3957 3957 3957 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at 
the country level. The instrumental variable is the 3-year oil price shock defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the Polity2 score; column (2) the change in the executive constraints score; column (3) the change in 
the executive recruitment score; and column (4) the change in the political competition score. Excluded countries are those that produce or consume more 
than 1 percent of world oil production. These countries are Algeria, Canada, China, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. The 
specification in column (1) controls for the Polity2 score at t-1, and the specifications in columns (2)-(4) for the relevant Polity sub-score at t-1.  

























Table 10. Robustness II: Oil Exporters Only 
 
                                                         ΔPolity2                        ΔExconst                          ΔExrec                        ΔPolcomp                                    
 









First-Stage  F-Statistic  22 22 22 22 
Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1518 1518 1518 1518 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at 
the country level. The instrumental variable is the 3-year oil price shock defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the Polity2 score; column (2) the change in the executive constraints score; column (3) the change in 
the executive recruitment score; and column (4) the change in the political competition score. The oil exporting countries are Albania, Algeria, Angola, 
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Qatar, Republic of Congo, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
and Yemen.  The specification in column (1) controls for the Polity2 score at t-1, and the specifications in columns (2)-(4) for the relevant Polity sub-score 




















Table 11. Robustness III: Is the Structural Relationship Different for OPEC?  
 
                                                      ΔPolity2                         ΔExconst                          ΔExrec                         ΔPolcomp                                    
 





















First-Stage F-Statistic   15  15  15  15 
Marginal Effect in 









Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4782 4782 4782 4782 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at 
the country level. The instrumental variable is the 3-year oil price shock defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3 
and the 3-year oil price shock interacted with an indicator variable that is 1 if and only if a country is part of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). The countries that are part of OPEC are Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the Polity2 score; column (2) the change in the executive 
constraints score; column (3) the change in the executive recruitment score; and column (4) the change in the political competition score. The specification 
in column (1) controls for the Polity2 score at t-1, and the specifications in columns (2)-(4) for the relevant Polity sub-score at t-1. *Significantly different 
from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. When the asterisks are next to the test statistic, the confidence 
















Table 12. Robustness IV: Time Period Sample Split  
 
                                                       ΔPolity2                        ΔExconst                         ΔExrec                          ΔPolcomp                                    
 
  
Panel A: Pre-1987 Period 
 









First-Stage  F-Statistic  61 61 61 61 
Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2419 2419 2419 2419 
  
Panel B: Post-1987 Period 
 









First-Stage  F-Statistic  22 22 22 22 
Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2363 2363 2363 2363 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at 
the country level. The instrumental variable is the 3-year oil price shock defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the Polity2 score; column (2) the change in the executive constraints score; column (3) the change in 
the executive recruitment score; and column (4) the change in the political competition score. The specification in column (1) controls for the Polity2 score 
at t-1, and the specifications in columns (2)-(4) for the relevant Polity sub-score at t-1. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 
percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.  
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Table 13. Robustness V: Using Net-Export Shares in 1970 and Restricting the Sample to Post-1970 
 
                                                      ΔPolity2                         ΔExconst                          ΔExrec                         ΔPolcomp                                    
 









First-Stage  F-Statistic  59 59 59 59 
Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3390 3390 3390 3390 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at 
the country level. The instrumental variable is the 3-year oil price shock defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the Polity2 score; column (2) the change in the executive constraints score; column (3) the change in 
the executive recruitment score; and column (4) the change in the political competition score. The specification in column (1) controls for the Polity2 score 
at t-1, and the specifications in columns (2)-(4) for the relevant Polity sub-score at t-1. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 





























Table 14. Robustness VI: Including Interregnum Periods and Using Transition Indicators 
 
                                                    Democratic Transition   Autocratic Reserval           ΔPolity2                     ΔRegtrans     
 









First-Stage  F-Statistic  38 12 48 48 
Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2649 2371 5020 5020 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at 
the country level. The instrumental variable is the 3-year oil price shock defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is a Democratic Transition Indicator that takes on the value of 1 in year t if the country is a democracy conditional 
on being an autocracy in t-1. The dependent variable in column (2) is an Autocratic Reversal Indicator that takes on the value of 1 if the country is an 
autocracy in year t conditional on being a democracy in t-1. The dependent variable in column (3) is the change in the Polity2 score when including 
interregnum (anarchy) periods and transition periods that are associated with interregnum. The dependent variable in column (4) is the change in the 
regime transition indicator that is 1 if the country experiences democratic improvements according to the Polity IV Regtrans variable (i e. a 3 or more 
points increase in the Polity2 score over 3 years or less); -1 if the country experiences democratic deteriorations (i.e. a 3 or more points decrease in the 
Polity2 score over 3 years or less); or 0. The specification in column (3) controls for the Polity2 score at t-1 and the specification in column (4) for the 
























Table 15. Robustness VII: Alternative Democracy Indicators 
 
                                                        ΔPolitical Rights           ΔFH Indicator             Przeworski et al.            Papaioannou   
                                     & Siourounis    
 









First-Stage  F-Statistic  34 34 31 29 
Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4263 4263 4573 4660 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at 
the country level. The instrumental variable is the 3-year oil price shock defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the Freedom House political rights score. The political rights score ranges between 1 and 7, and is 
re-scaled so that larger scores denote more democratic institutions. The dependent variable in column (2) is the change in the Freedom House trichotomous 
freedom indicator. The freedom indicator is re-scaled so that larger values denote more democratic institutions. The dependent variable in column (4) is the 
change in the democracy indicator from Przeworski et al. (2000); column (4) the change in the democracy indicator from Papaioannou and Siourounis 
(2008b). The specification in column (1) controls for the political rights score at t-1, the specification in column (2) for the Freedom House trichotomous 
freedom indicator at t-1, the specification in column (3) for the Przeworski et al. (2000) democracy indicator at t-1, and the specification in column (4) for 
the Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) democracy indicator at t-1. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, 




















Table 16. Robustness VIII: World Bank GDP Data 
 
                                               ΔPolity2           ΔPolitical Rights      ΔFH Indicator        Przeworski et al.        Papaioannou   
                                     & Siourounis    
 
















First-Stage  F-Statistic  8 8 8 9 7 
Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4507 3852 3852 4029 4154 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. The p-values in square brackets are based on the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance. 
A key property of the Anderson-Rubin test is robustness to weak instruments (see for example Andrews and Stock, 2005). The instrumental variable is the 
3-year oil price shock defined as in (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t-3. The dependent variable in column (1) is the 
change in the Polity2 score. The range of the Polity2 score is between -10 and 10 (larger values denote more democratic institutions). The dependent 
variable in column (2) is the change in the Freedom House political rights score. The political rights score ranges between 1 and 7, and is re-scaled so that 
larger scores denote more democratic institutions. The dependent variable in column (3) is the change in the Freedom House trichotomous freedom 
indicator. The freedom indicator is re-scaled so that larger values denote more democratic institutions. The dependent variable in column (4) is the change 
in the democracy indicator from Przeworski et al. (2000). The dependent variable in column (5) is the change in the democracy indicator from 
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b). The specification in column (1) controls for the Polity2 score at t-1, the specification in column (2) controls for the 
political rights score at t-1, the specification in column (3) for the Freedom House trichotomous freedom indicator at t-1, the specification in column (4) for 
the Przeworski et al. (2000) democracy indicator at t-1, and the specification in column (5) for the Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) democracy 























































































































































1960 1980 2000 1960 1980 2000
1960 1980 2000 1960 1980 2000
Ecuador Egypt
Mexico Nigeria
Oil Price Polity2
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